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PreJ.iniin<l.~ notes 
The  increasing number  of business  concentrations in the  Common  l'Iarket 
makes  the working  out  of more  modern  and more  precise legislation on 
concentration necessary.  The  body  of lm·Js  on  competition hitherto 
available does  not  suffice to deal adequately with the dangers  to the 
maintenance of effective competition which  result  from  the continually 
increasing process 'of concentration.  The  Community  Treaties provide 
for a  systematic control of business  concentrati6ns only in the  coal 
and steel sector (Article 66  ECSC  Treaty).  Concentration proceedings 
in the other sectors of the economy  are subject to Community  rules 
on  competition only if they consitute an abuse of a  dominant  position 
within the meaning of Article 86  of the EEC  Treaty. 
'l'he  Council  of 1~inisters alread;y pointed out  in the Second Programme 
for medium-term  economic  policy of 1969 
1  that  structural adaptation 
to  Common  Market  conditions of production and  sale would be  expressed 
by an acceleration of the process of concentration;  in this connection 
the  Council  stressed the urgency of defining clearly the policy to be 
fol_lov:ed  in the field of business  concentrations. 
The  Paris Summit  Conference  of 19  to  21  October  1972  raised  the 
problem of business  concentration and  stated as  follows:  "The  Heads 
of State or of Government  consider it necessary to  seek to establish a 
single industrial base for the  Community  as  a  whole.  This  involves the 
formulation of measures  to ensure that mergers affecting firms 
established in the  Community  are in harmony with the  economic  and social 
aims  of the  Community,  and  the maintenance of fair competition as much 
l  Ch.  II (11)  (OJ  No  L  129,  30  ],~ay 1969,  p.  23) '  .  .., 
within the  Connnon  I'Iarket  as in external  markets  in conformity with the 
rules laid down  by the treaties."1  The  Heads  of State or Government 
further agreed that "it· was  desirable to make  the t.ridest  possible use 
of all the provisions of the Treaties,  including Article  235  of the 
EEC  Treaty." 
In its Reso.lution of 5 December  1972  on  measures to bo  taken against 
inflation,  the  Council has 
"taken note of the 
Commission's  intention to  submit,  independently of the application of 
Article 86  to certain cases,  proposals  aimed at  setting up  more 
t  t .  t  1  t  t .  f  t  .  .  ., 2  sys  ema  ~c con  ro  over concen ra 1ons  o  a  cer a1n  s1ze·  • 
In its Resolution,  passed on  7 June  1971  on the basis of the Berkhouwer 
Report,  the_  European Parliament  demanded  "that for concentrations 
which  exceed a  certain share of the market  or a  certain size there 
should be prior notification;  such concentrations  should be  regarded 
as  authorized only if the  Commission  does  not  raise any objection 
within a  time-limit  yet to  b~ fixed"3• 
The  Commission,  in its Communication  of 10 111ay  1973  to the Council 
on the Programme  for an  Industrial and Technological Policy,  explains 
that "an  obligation to  report  the more  important  concentrations, 
regardless of the  form  of the  concentration,  should be instituted,  so 
that the  Commission  can intervene before the concentration is carried 
out,  should it hold the latter to be  incompatible with the maintenance 
of competition in oonformi  ty with the aims  of the  Common  Market ,A. 
1  Communique  issued by the Heads  of State or of Government  of the Gou11tries 
of the enlarged  Com~unity at their meeting in Paris on the 19  and  20 
of October 1972,  point  7. 
2  OJ  No  C 133,  23  December  1972,  p.  14. 
3 Resolution of the European Parliament  of the rules on  competition and 
the position of European undertakings  in the  Common  I-~arket and in the 
v-wrld  economy.  OJ  No  C 66,  1 July 1971,  p.  19. 
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The  Court  of Justice,  in its Judgment  of 21  February 1973  on  Ceso 
No.  6/72 {Continental  Can),  also refers to the aims  of the Corn..rnunity. 
It declares  in that  judgment  that the rules  on  competition of the 
EEC  Treaty - while differing in their detailed development  - "aim at 
the  same  goal  of maintaining effective competition in the  Common 
~ilarket".  The  pursuance of this aim,  vJhich  is more  closely defined in 
.Article  3  (f), is, as the Court  of Justice also stressed,  indispensable 
for the fulfilment  of the  Community's  tasks. 
If .Article  3  (f) provides  for the institution of a  system ensuring that 
competition in the  Cornmon  Market  is not  distorted,  it most  certainly 
requires,  as the Court of Justice also underlined,  that competition 
should not  be  eliminated. 
Artj ole 85,  which prohibits agreements restricting competition bet1v-een 
several undertakings,  and Article 86,  which  deals with one-sided 
activity by one  or more  undertakings•  both aim at maintaining effective 
competition in the  Common  Market.  As  Article 85  even prohibits 
restrictions on  competition tvhich  merely rdfect competition,  it 
cannot be  supposed that .Article 86  of the Treaty allows  undertakings 
to attain,  through a  concentration, 
11 ~mch a  dominant  position 
that any serious competition is practically excluded."(Judgment  Continental Can) • 
.Any  differing legal treatment  of cartels and business concentrations 
would,  following  the Court  of Justice  .1 
11make  a  breach in Community 
legislation on  competition which  could  jeopardize the orderly functioning 
of the  Common  ~hrketn. -4-
Development  of concentration in the  Common  Market 
--------------~,------------------------------------
The  number  of business  concentrations in the  Comraon  :narket  is steadily 
increasing.  Betvreen  1962  and  1970 the yearly number  of concentrations 
in the  Community  of the Six - defined as financial participations of 
more  than 50%- rose from  173  to 6J.2.  In comparison with'l962,  the 
yearly number  of concentrations hnd  increased three and  a  half times 
by 1970.  In comparison with 1962-66,  the rate of increase in 1966-70 
had almost  doubled. 
Since 1965  there has also beeh 
concentrations in Great Britain. 
The  increasing interlocking of 
an  increase in the number  of 
capital arrar.gements has  caused the share of the  100  largest  industrial 
undertakings  in the total industrial turnovers to rise in the United 
Kingdom  from  26 %  in 1953  to  50 %  in 1970,  and in Germany  from  34 % 
in 1954  to 50  ';~  in 1969.  In France,  the degree of concentration is less. 
Industry in Italy is least  concentrated. 
The  question as to how  the increasing number  of business  concentrations 
has affected the market  structures of the various sectors is of 
special importance  for competition policy.  In order to ascertain these 
effects,  the  Co~~ission set up  a  study programme  in 1970/71 to 
analyse  concentrations.  The  results of these studies  show  a  clear, 
in some  sectors  even  an alarming,  increase in the degree  of 
concentration. 5  IV/330/73-E 
In some  cases  the process of concentration has already  go~e so  far that 
as few  as  four  suppliers are left in the Community.  In many  other cases 
there has been a  sometimes  considerable reduction in undertakings,  the 
number  of suppliers being reduced by  up  to as much  as half. 
1:Iith  the  reduction in the numbers  of~ suppliers,  the  four largest uncler-
ta~ings'  s  share of the  total turnover,  and of tli.e  total number  of employees 
increased.  This was  found  to be  the case in all the  sectors investigated 
in the  Community. 
Beside  those  studies the  Conunission  t s  data,  Hhioh  was  obtained by  continual 
supervision of certain sectorst  also reveals a  very high degree of concen-
tration in many  sectors. In these  sectors between 80 %  and 90  %  of the 
total Europea~1 turnover respectively production was  al1~ady in the hands 
of the  four  largest U..l'ldertakings. 
In a  further large number  of sectors the  degree  of concentration is not 
as high. Nevertheless?  here also,  one  can observe an appreciable  increase 
in the  rhythm  of the  concentration process. IV  330/73 - E 
Eeed for  control.  over mersers 
This  development  should not  continu~ m1controlled.  In a 
large number of sectors the situation is such that a  further 
development  of concentration co.uld of imperil the maintenance of 
effective compet.ition.  Bymerging undertakings 
could attain a  position on the market  v:hich  would  enable them to 
avoid.  the pressure of ·competition.  They 1·muld  no  longer be obliged 
to adapt  the price,  qur  .. ntity and  quu.lity of their products to trends 
of demand.  The  market  position of such undertakings allows them  to 
adopt  a  price policy which is largely independe:1t  of economic 
ddvelopments;,  that  reduces  the effectiveness of anti-inflation 
measures  and may  amplify business cycles.  The  price trend, 
no  longer controlled by the market,  alters the distribution of  income 
to the detriment  of the  customers,  Yho  also have to accept  restrictions 
on their freedom  of choice 1·:hen  pu:."Chr'.sing.  The  t,;orkers'  freedom 
to choose  amc:1g  several  employers  is e-lso  restricted. 
The  effects of business  concentrations are particularly serious 
because  the concentration brings about 
e.n  irreversible alteration of the me.rket  structure. 
If a  dominant  position is c.tte.ined,  no  real competition from the 
other suppliers is,  as  a  rule,  any longer to be  expected,  unleGs 
there are far-reaching changes  in market  conditions.  Further, 
dominn.nt  under takings are often in a  position to  preve~t new 
suppliers  from  entering the market.  This  is especially the case 
if they operate simultaneously on  several markets  and thus have 
additional  scope  for their practices,  espaci.:;,lly in regard to 
price-fixing. 7  IV/330/73-E 
The  moment  has come  for  the European Communi-ty  to  cet 11p  a  r:J.vre 
'  . 
systematic control of transactions bringing  abo~1t a  concentration. Il 
is for this reason that the Commission  proposes a  new  regulation on  this 
rm1tter,  based on  Articles  87  and  235 1  which  provides,  in its main points, 
for the  following  t 
1°)  concentrations which  give  the power  to hinder effective competition 
are  incompatible with the  common  market.  Concentrations of less im-
portance,  which  are not likely to  give  such povmr  are excluded from 
the  applic1:1,tion  of this rule,  in so  far as th'<;r  do  not exceed certain 
fixed  qu~~titative criteria 
2°)  concentrations which  aro necessary to realise an essential Community 
objective can be  exempted  from  the  incompatibility >..ri th the  common 
market  ; 
3°)  concentrations which  concern undertakings whoso  acgrogate  turnover is 
no;c  less than· one  tho1:sana million units of c,cco·mt  are  subject  to prior 
hotification. This notification has a  suspenso~~ effect of three months 
in  ~>rhich  the Corrunission  can initiate proceedings 
4°)  if the  Commission  doies not initiate proceedings,  the concentration. 
is deemed  compatible with the  comflon  market. If proceedings are ini-
ti<."J.tecl.,, a  final  decision must  be  taken at the latest at the  end of a 
period of nine  months  ; 
5°)  the legal acts which  have  taken place in connection with a  concentration 
\vhich  is declared incompatible ,,ri th the  common  market  do  not become  void. 
I'rom  the esse:1tial che,ractoristics of the proposed regu,lg,t:i,on it vrill 
"'"'· 
be  clear that  JGhe  draft neither proposes a  system Hhich  is - like:  aa:-ticle  66, 
of the  Coal  and Steel Treaty,  based on  prior authorization,  nor of generaL 
prohibition,  but rather one  where  the incompatibility with the  common  market 
wQst  be  established case by  case after assessment by the Commission  of the 
power  of a  concentration to hinder effective competitio:l in the  common  mar-
ket. r-r  330/73  - m 
Under Article  l  (l) of tl1e  draft regulation concentration between 
undertakings,  v.rhereby  they acquire the power to hinder effective 
competition or enhance  such power are incompatible with the  Common 
Market,  insofar as they:  may  affect trade between  ~,~ember States. 
In its "Continental  Can"  judgement  cited above,  the Court  of Justice 
of the European  Communities  referred particularly to the concept 
of preserving effective competition in order to describe the object 
of the competition rules in the EEC  Treaty.  The  concept  of effective 
competition can thus be  ta~en as a  basic criteria for appraising 
the compatibility 1vi th the  Common  Market. 
The  second part of paragraph 1  defines the provision given iri 
part one  of said paragraph.  The  concentration may  be incompatible 
with the Conwon  Market  by virtue of the size of the  share of the 
market  held or of the special availability of technical knowledge, 
raw  materials or capital.  The  absolute size of the undertakings 
concerned as well as their links with suppliers,  resellers or 
undertakings  of third countries must  be  considered.  Further,  the 
ability of other suppliers to  compete  and their conduct,  the 
structure of demand  and  supply,  the  limits on  access to the market, 
the rate of technical progress,  the growth of the relevant  sector 
and  of actual or potential international competition and  competition 
from  substitute products must  all be considered. 
In appraising concentration transactions the impliccttions in respect 
of the industrial development  cannot  be  ignored  A certain re-
grouping might,  for instance,  be the sole solution practicable 
to restore some  degree of competition in a  market  otherwise  completely 
dominc>.ted'  by an undertaking which  shows  a  II\arked  in·t;ernal growth-rat e. - 9- IV  330/73 - E 
Concentrations  in this context  mean  transactions lvhic!l  directly 
or indirectly bring about  concentrations  involving at least one 
undertaking situated within the  Common  Market.  This definition 
covers  intra-Community concentrations· as \'tell as  concentrations in 
vvhich  undertakings of third countries ere involved. 
It makes  it possible to deal with all concentrations which  are likely 
to prevent  effective competition ioJi thin the  Cormnon  Market ,  whether 
of the horizontal, vertical or conglomerate type,  and l<Jhether  or not 
they involve undertakings  in a  dominant  position. 
The  proposed regulation only covers  concentrations 'I<Thich  bring 
independent undertakings together under the  same  control.  External 
growth by means  of concentration can substantially modify market 
structures in a  short  space of time.  It frequently takes place 
independently of the competitive capacity of the undertakings  concerned. 
Internal  g~ovrlh,  on  the other hand,  which  does  not  fall under this 
regulgtion is as  such not  subject  to  any restriction in any anti-trust 
legislation. 
Article 1  provides that  concentrations which  fall within its scope 
are incompatible with the  Common  Market.  To  avoid a  decision taken 
under Article 1  (1)  from  leading national courts in the legal systems 
of certain Member  States to annul  an act  carried out  in connection 
with the concentration which  is the subject of the decision, Article  3  (2) 
fUrther provides that a  decision that  a  given concentration is 
compatible does not  automatically render null and void any legal 
instruments relating to the relevant  concentration. - 10  - IV 330/73  - E 
Article  1  (2)  provides  for a  general excGption to the rules 
governing incompatibility established by paragraph 1;  as  regards 
concentrations 1vhich  meet  two  requirements,  namely that the 
~~gregate turnover be less than 200  million UA  and  that the 
share of the market not  exceed  25 %  in any one  member  countryo 
This  clause means  that the regulation does  not  extend to 
concentrations which  are not  such as to prevent  effective competition 
in the  co~non market  or in a  part of it. 
Article 1  (3) provides for derogation from  the rules governing 
incompatibility as  regards concentrations which,  although caught 
by Article 1,  are indispensible to the attainment  of an objective 
which is given priority treatment  in the  comn1on  interest of the 
Community.  This derogation IDP-kes  it possible to take account  of 
certain necessities of industrial,  tGchnological,  social and  regional 
policy applied at Community  level.  In the same  vmy  can the integration 
into an important  group  sometimes  become  indispensable to secure 
the rentability of an undertaking situated in an area v.rhich  is 
economically underdeveloped or declining,  and  where  emplo~~ent 
problems  are particularly grave.  This derogation does not, 
however,  hn.ve  the effect of a  legal exception.  Under Article 3  (3) 
it must  be applied by a  decision granting an individual authorization. 11  IV  330/73  - E 
Article 2 defines concentrations in terms  largely inspired by 
Decision No.  24/54 of 6 t!:ay  1954  laying down  in implementation 
of Article 66  (1)  of'ECSC  Treaty a  regulation on what  constitutes 
control df an undertaking  (OJ'  ECSC  of 11  May  1954,  page  3,  4,  5)· 
This decision,  taken by the High Authority after consulting the 
CounCil  of Einisters,  has  shown  its value over nearly 20  years 
of prnctical·· application,  during which more· than  200  individual 
dedsions wero  te.ken.  Concentrations between Ul'ldertakings  are 
defined in that Article by reference to a  concept  of control 
cc'nsisting in econbmic  terms  of the power  which an  undertakin~ 
htkS  to dotermi<ne  how  another undertaking sha.H  operate. 
Article 3 holds the  Commission  responsibr'e  for applying Article  1, 
rmd  grc"nts  her,  subject to verification by the Court  of  Jus~  ice, 
exclu~ive co;npetence.  The  cooperation with the authorities of the 
Ilember  States (Article 20)  is guaranteed: 
ArticJe  3 ,  second paragraph  provides  ~hat a  c!e.cisi~n concerning 
incompatibili  t.y with the  common  market  may  not  automatically render 
null snd void  legal inst;ru.ments  adopted in connection with the 
concentration (see  comments  on Article 1). 
!.. 
Paragraph 3 provides for deconcentration orders.  Such  orders  oblige 
\  'l  ',', 
the undertakings to  whom  they are  ad~ressed, to re-establish the. 
«  • 
provisions of effective competition.  They are to be  issued either by 
decision tiken pursuant to Article 3 (l) or by separate decision 
which,  while based on  the first decision,  may  be taken subsequently 
vlhere  this is necessary under the circumstances of the case.  In order 
to oblige undertakings to oarr.y out  such deooncentration 
measures,  the  imposition of high periodic penalties should be 
sufficient  (Article 14  (2) of the regulation). - 12- IV/330/73 - E 
Paragraph 4,  following on  from  Article l  (3)  stipulates that the 
derogation provided for in the interest of attaining a  priority 
Community  objective may  be  granted only by  a  decision giving 
an  individual authorization and  thus declaring Article 1  (1)  to 
be  inapplicable. The  obligations and  conditions which may  be 
imposed  in connection with  such a  decision  shou~d make  it possible 
to achieve certain requirements which are necessitated by the 
scale or nature of the approved  combination. 
Paragraph 5 gives the Commission  the  sole power to apply Article 3 subject 
to review by  the Court  of Justice. 
Article 4 stipulates that concentrations which  reach or exceed  a  certain 
figure must  be  notified in advance.  Article 6  (2)  (time-limit for,commencing 
proceedings)  shows  that notification must  be  made  at least 3 months  before 
the concentration is effected. 
Article 4 (1)  provides that concentrations which  involve undertakings whose 
aggregate turnover for the last financial year preceding concentration, 
exceeds one  thousand million units of  account  must  be  notified in advance. 
The  turnover criterion applicable to industrial and  commercial  undertakings 
was  chosen because it is so  simple;  the market  share is by  nature more 
difficult to det$rmine and thus,  although a  possible criterion,  i~ less 
suitable as a  ground upon  which  the obligation to notify could be'based. 
The  turnover to be  used is the aggregate turnover of all the undertakings 
directly or indirectly involved (see Article 5 (1),  and is thus not 
restricted to turnover within the Common  Market  but  extends to turnover 
outside the Common  Market. rt/330/13-E 
:Eased  on  this definition of turn-over,  about  300 undertakings-including 
banking and insurance companies  falling within Article 5  (2),  would have 
had to notify their concentration operations,  when  the turn-over of the 
•·: 
undertaking taken over exeeded thirty million units of account. This number 
of enterprises does  not however  give  a  complete picture of the theoretical 
consequences of establishing a  compulsory obligation to notify,  because 
this obligation arises,  of course,  also,  where  undertakings merge,  whose 
turn-over is. less than one  thousand million units of account,  but who  ar-
rive at or exceed the  fixed ceiling by  merging. 
Follovring article 4 (2),  the obligation :to  notify does not come  in 
when  the  turn-over of the undcrtc:.king taken over is less than thirty mil-
lion units of account. 
Article 4  (3)  points out  1vho  shall discharge the obligation to notify. 
Article 4  (4)  provides for prior voluntary notification of concentrations 
which  do  not arrive at the ceiling of one  thousand million units of account. 
This arrangement  is to give interested undertakings  the chance  .. to benefit 
from  the procedural regUlations starting from article 6. 
Concluding the  explanations concerning Article 4,  it must  be  po~ted 
out,  that the.  obligation of prior notification does  in no  wa;y  prejudice the 
applicability of Article 1  (1). Inversely,  a  concentration  C?~ fall within 
the  scope of application of Article 1  (1),  whithout being subjected to 
notification. 
.;. - 14- - E 
Article 5  stipulates that the aggregate t·urnover and  1:1arket  share 
referred to in the Draft  Regulation must  take  into account  not 
only the activitl.es of the undertl'lkings participntirig in the 
concentration but also those of undertakings or associations of 
undertakings which  cu•e  directly involved in the transa,c-tiion in 
question. 
The  turnover criterion cannot  apply to banks  and  insurance 
companies.  Article 5 (2)  substitutes other  criteri~ in their case. 
The  criterion for be,nking  and  financial  i~sti  tutions was  based 
on  a  comparison between the main  industrial undertakings  and the 
principal banks  and  finance-houses.  It was  found that the total 
assets of the banks  and finance-houses  represent  approximately 
ten times the turnover  o£:  the corresponding industrial underta..ldngs. 
For insurance companies,  the to·tal of premiums  received has  been 
adopted as  criterion. 
Article 6  opens the procedual  pe.rt  of the Regulation. 
Paragraph 1  concerns all concentrations which n.re  likely to 
be  caught  by Article 1  (1)  or (3),  regardless  of whether notification 
is obligatory.  The  commencement  of proceedings by the.Commission, 
of .which  notice must  be given to the undertakings  involvGd  e,nd  to 
the competent  a.uthori  ties of the I:1ember  States, is an important 
facet  of the procedure but does not  have  the force of a  decision. 
It is essential to the due  advancement  of examinatic-n of the affair, 
and is the starting-point for the 9 month  period in which all 
decisions pursuant  to Articles  3  (1) or (4) must  be tr-ken 
(see Article 17  (l) (a)  ). 
/ ~ 15  _.  IV  330/73  - E 
Pc::rr'grc-phs  2,  3  Dnd  4  introduce special arrangements  for 
concentrc.'ctions  c-vhich  r1ust  be notified.  1f,fhere  proceedings are 
necessary they must  be  commenced  ~ri thin 3  months  following 
notification (paragraph 2).  Otherwise at the  end  of 3 months 
the  concentration ns  notified is presumed to be  compatible ;v-ith 
the  common  market  (paragraph 4).  Under Article 7  (1),  the 
concentr2tion may  dso be  effected if before the  end of the 
3  months  period the Commission  infort.1s  those concerned that 
pr')Cecdings are not  being conrrnenced. 
These provisions  enable those  concerned to knm,r  relatively quickly 
whether there are  ~ny objections to the concentration.  If not,  and 
except  in cases where  the relevant  undertakings agree to  extension 
of that period,  or where  incomplete information (paragraph 2) 
or incorrect  or misleading information (paragraph  3)  is provided 
at the time of notification,  those undertclcings  are reassured as 
to the validity of the concentration.  These  important  consequences 
of non-intervention by the  Commission  within a  fixed period 
voere  the reasons for providing e..lso  for optional prior notification 
of concentrations of which notification is not  obligatory 
(see hrticle 4  (4)  ). 
Article 7 (1) provides  for preliminary.suspension of a  concentration. 
Such  suspension is  link0d to the optional or obligatory prior 
notification.  It is valid for the period during which the  Connni ssion 
may  comrnence  the proceeding. 
Paragraph  2  furthermore  entitles the Commission  to oblige the 
undertakings'by decision td suspend  concentration while proceedings 
are pending. 16- IV  330/73 - E 
Paragraphs  1  cmd  2  of Article 8,  concerning com.inunication  of 
objections and  hearings,  incorporate the correspondine paragraphs 
of Article 19  of Council  Regulation No.  17  (OJ  No.  13,  21.  2.  62). 
Paragraph  3 specifies the relevant  rules  of  Re~~lation No. 
99/63/EEC  on  the hearings  provided for in Article  19  (1)  ru1d  (2) 
of Council  Re~~lation No.  17  (OJ  No.  127,  20.8.63),  and 
declares them applicable  • 
.  Article 9  provides that where  the  Com::nission  has  fcriD£,lly  commenced 
proceedings but  finds,  while  examining the affair,  that it should 
not  ?.ct,  it must  formally close the proceedings  and  so  inforr.1 
the relevant undertakings  and  the  competent  authorities of the 
Member  States. 
~2-l~~lQ, on  requests for information,  is the  sruue  as the 
corresponding Article 11  of Regulation No.  17. 
A~~l£_ll, on  investigations by the authorities of the Member 
States,  is the  so.me  as the corresponding Article 13  of Regulation 
No.  17. 
Article 12,  on  the investigating powers  of the  Commission,  takes over, 
t'li th one  exception,  the corresponding Article 14  of Regu1dion  No.  17. 
Article 12  (1)  sentence  2  (b)  is formulated as  follo.-is:  to take 
"or request"  copies of or extracts  from  the books  and  business 
records.  This addition is necessary with regard to the experiences 
made  during investigations. 
Paragraph  l  of Article 13,  on  fines,  takes  over the corresponding 
prvvision of Article 15  (l) of Regulation No.  17  with,  however, 
a  variation as regards the amount  of the increased fines. 
Paragraph 2  provides for the imposition of fines  of from  1.000 to 
1  million units of account  for breaches of the obligation to give 
prior notification.  These  large pennlties should make  it possible 
to  ensure that the obligation to notify is respected. - 17- IV  330/73  - E 
Par?,graph  -3  provides for fines  whGre  the obligation to  suspend 
a  concentration is not  observed or where  a  decision taken pursuant 
to Article  3  (1)  is not  conroJ.ied  with~  The  fine may  be  as much 
a~ 10 %  vf the value of  the  reorganised assets. 
Article 14,  on  periodic penalty pnyments;  t'lk:es  over in its points 
(a)  and  (b),  points  (c)  and  (d)  of Article  16  (l) of Regulation 
t:o.  17.  Ho;,-revcr,  the amounts  hn.ve  been  increased. 
Paregraph 2  provides for periodic penalty payments  up 
to  50.000 units qf account  per day 'of delr.y in order to compel 
observance of measures  provided for by a  decision tBken pursuant 
to Article 3  (3). 
Article 15 1  on  revieH by the  Court  of Justice,  is the sarJe  as 
Artic1e 17  of Regulation lro.  17. 
Arti0le 16,  on professional  secrecy,  takes  over Article 20  of 
Regulation  N::>.  }7. 
Under Article 17  the period within which decisions must  be taken 
pursuant to ArUcle  3  ( l) or ( 4)  c.t  9  months  calcul?.ted from the 
date of commencement  of proceedings is stipulated.  This time-limit 
may  be  extended where  those  concerned cgree  and vrhere  circumstances 
so  require.  Pc:ragraph 1  further provides that the 9  month  period 
is not  applicable v.rhere  on the basis of a  formal  decision it has 
been necessary to request  further information or t,;)  carry out 
investigations. 
Paragraphs  2  and  3 provide for publication of decisions  teken 
pursua,nt  to Article 3,  l-lhile  account  is taken of the  legitimate 
interest of undertakings  in the protection of business  seoretso· - 18-
Article 18,  en the unit  of account,  is the same  as Article 18 
of Regulation No.  17. 
Jl,.rticle  19,  on  liais~m with the r,uthori  ties of the lv1ember  States, 
is an adopted version of Article 10  of  Regul~tion No.  17.  It 
should be pointed out,  however,  that  paragraph 2  :1.1lows  the 
I>ll:cmber  States to  rGquest the Conmission to  commence  pr:Jceedings 
under trticle 6. 
trticle 20  is based on  the fact  that the proposed regulation 
covers also  concentrations falling within the scope of Article  86 
of the EEC  Treaty.  Article  20  therefore declnres Regulations No.  17  , 
and,No.  1017/68Lnot  applicable  on  concentrations  caught by the 
proposed Regulation. 
Article  21  provides that  implementing provisions relating to 
notifications will be  adopted separately by the Commission. 
Article  22  1rrill  fix a  date f:)r the entry into force of the 
Regulation. 
)_  Regulation  (EEC)  No.  1017/68 of the Council  applying rules of 
competition tJ transport by rail,  road  and  inland waterway. ~·· 
\ 
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II 
(Preparatory Acts) 
COMMISSION 
Proposal  for  a  Regulation  (EEC)  of  the  Council  on  the  control  of  concentrations 
between undertakings 
(Submitted to the Council by the Commission on 20 july 1973) 
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, 
Having  regard  to  the  Treaty establishing  the  Euro-
pean  Economic  Community  and  in  particular  to 
Articles 87 and 235 thereof; 
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission; 
Having  regard  to  the  Opinion  of  the  European 
Parliament; 
.Having regard to the  Opinion of the Economic and 
Social Committee; 
Whereas,  for  the  achievement  of  the  objectives  of 
the Treaty establishing the European Economic Com-
munity,  Article  3  (f)  requires  the  Community  to 
institute  'a  system  ensuring  that competition  in  t:he 
common market is not distorted'; 
Whereas  analysis  of market  structures  in  the  Com-
munity  shows  that  the  concentration  process  is  be-
coming  faster  and· that  the  degree  of  concentration 
is  growing in  such  manner that the  preservation  of 
effective  competition in the common market and the 
objective set out in Article 3 (f)  could be jeopardized; 
Whereas  concentration must therefore  be made sub-
ject to a systematic control arrangement; 
Whereas  the  Treaty  already  provides  some  powers 
of action of the Community to this end; 
Whereas Article 86  applies to ,  concentrations effected 
by undertakings holding  a  dominant position in  the 
common market or ~n a subs,tantiaJ part of it which 
strengthen  such position to  such  an extend that the 
resulting  degree  of  dominance  would  substantially 
restrict competition; 
Whereas  the power of action aforesaid extends only 
to such concentrations, as  would result in only under-
takings  remaining  in  the  market  whose  conduct 
depended on the undertaking which had effected the 
concentration;  whereas  it  does  not  extend  to  the 
prevention of such concentrations; 
Whereas  additional  powers  of  action  must  be  pro-
vided for to make it possible to act against other con-
centrations  which  may  distort  competition  in  the 
common  market  and  to  establish  arrangements  for 
controlling them before they are effected; 
Whereas  under Article  235  of the  Treaty  the  Com-
munity may give itself the powers of action necessary 
for the attainment of its objectives; 
Whereas,  to  institute  a  system  ensuring  that  com-
petition in the common market is  not distorted, it is 
necessary, in so far as  trade between Member States 
inay  be  affected,  to submit to control arrangements 
such  concentrations  which  give  undertakings  the 
power to  prevent  effective  competition  in  the  com-
mon  market or in a  substantial part of it,  or which 
strengthen such a power; 
Whereas the power to  prevent effective  competlt!on 
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scope for choice available to suppliers and consumers, 
the economic and financial power of the undertakings 
concerned, the structure of the markets affected  and 
supply and demand trends for the relevant goods or 
services; 
Whereas  concentrations  which,  by  reason  of  the 
small  significance  of  turnover  and  market share  of 
the undertakings concerned, are not likely to impede 
the preservation of effective competition in the com-
mon market may be excluded from this  Regulation; 
Whereas it may be  found necessary, for the purpose 
of reconciling objectives  to  be attained  in  the  com-
mon interest of the Community, especially within the 
frame  of  common  policies,  to  exempt  certain  con-
centrations  from  incompatibility,  under  conditions 
and obligations to be determined case by case; 
Whereas the Commission should be entitled to take 
decisions  to  prevent  or  terminate  concentrations 
which  are  incompatible  with  the  common  market, 
decisions  designed to re-establish conditions of effec-
tive competition and decisions declaring that a  parti-
cular concentration may be considered to be compat-
ible  with  the  common  market;  whereas  the  Com-
mission should be given exclusive  jurisdiction in  this 
matter, subject to review by the Court of Justice; 
Whereas,  to  ensure  effective  superv1s1on,  prior noti-
fication  of major concentrations  and the  suspension 
of  concentrations  by  undertakings  should  be  made 
obligatory; 
Whereas  a  time  limit within which the  Commission 
must commence proceedings in respect  of a  concen-
tration  notified  to  it  and  a  time-limit  within  which 
it must give a final decision on the incompatibility of 
a  concentration  with  the  common  market  should 
be laid down; 
Whereas  undertakings  concerned  must  be  accorded 
the right to be heard by the Commission as  soon as 
proceedings  have  commenced,  and  third  parties 
showing  a  sufficient  interest  must  be  given  the 
opportunity of submitting their comments; 
Whereas  the  Commission  must  have  the  assistance 
of the Member States  and must also  be empowered 
to require information to be given  and to carry out 
the necessary investigations in order to examine con-
concentrations  in  the  light  of  provisions  of  this 
Regulation; 
Whereas  compliance  with  this  Regulation  must  be 
enforceable  by  means  of fines  and  periodic  penalty 
payments;  whereas it is  desirable to confer upon the 
Court of Justice,  pursuant to  Article  172,  unlimited 
jurisdiction to that extent; 
Whereas this Regulation should extepd b<ilth  to  con-
centrations  which  ·constitUte  abuste5  iJ  dominant#, 
positions and to concentrations which give the under-
takings  concerned  the  power  to  preVent  effective 
competition  in  the  common  market;  whereas  it 
should therefore be stipulated that Regulations (EEC) 
Nos  17  and 1017/68  no  longer apply to  concentra-
tions from the date of ehtry into force of the present 
Regulation, 
HAS  ADOPTED  THIS  REGULATION: 
Basic provisions 
Article  1 
1.  Any  tmnsac6on which ha,,  the ,direct or ,indirect 
effect  of  bringing  about  a  concentration  between 
undertakings or groups of undertakings, at least one 
of which is established in the common market, where-
by  they  acquire  or  enhance  the  power  to  hinder 
effective  competition  in  the  common  market  or  in 
a  substancial  part thereof,  is  incompatible with  the 
common market in  so  far as  the concentration may 
affect trade between Member States. 
The  power  to  hinder  effective  competltlon  shall  be 
appraised  by  reference in particular to the extent to 
which  suppliers and consumers have  a  possibility  of 
choice,  to  the  economic  and financial  power  of the 
undertakings concerned, to the structure of the mar-
kets  affected,  and to  supply and  demand trends  for 
the relevant goods or services. 
2.  Paragraph 1 shall not apply where: 
the  aggregate  turnover  of  the  undertakings  par-
ticipating  in  the  concentration  is  less  than  200 
million units of account and 
the  goods  or  services  concerned  by  the  concen-
tration do not account in any Member State for 
more than 25  % of the turnover in identical goods 
or  services  or  in  goods  or  services  which,  by 
reason  of  their  characteristics,  their  price  and 
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the  use  for  which  they  are  intended,  may  be 
regarded as similar by the consumer. 
3.  Paragraph 1 may, however,  be  declared inapplic-
able to concentrations which are indispensable to the 
attainment  of  an  objective  which  is  given  priority 
treatment in the common interest of the Community. 
Article 2 
Definition of concentration 
1.  The  concentrations  referred  to  in  Article  1  are 
those whereby a person or an undertaking or a group 
of persons or undertakings, acquires control of one or 
several undertakings. 
2.  Control  is  constituted  by  rights  or  contracts 
which, either separately or jointly, and having regard 
to the  considerations  of fact or law involved,  make 
it  possible  to  determine  how  an  undertaking  shall 
operate, and particularly by: 
(1)  Ownership or the right to use  all  or part of the 
assets of an undertaking; 
(2)  Rights  or  contracts  which  confer  power  to  in-
fluence  the  composition,  voting  or  decisions  of 
the organs of an undertaking; 
(3)  Rights  or  contracts  which  make  it  possible  to 
manage the business of an undertaking; 
(4)  Contracts  made  with  an  undertaking concerning 
the  computation  or  appropriation  of its  profits; 
(5)  Contracts  made  with  an  undertaking concerning 
the  whole  or  an  important· part  of  supplies  or 
outlets,  where the duration of  these  contracts  or 
the  quantities  to  which  they  relate  exceed  what 
is  usual  in  commercial  contracts  dealing  with 
those matters. 
3.  Control  is  acquired  by persons,  undertakings  or 
groups of persons or undertakings who: 
(1)  Are  holders  of  the  rights  or  entitled  to  rights 
under the contracts concerned; 
(2)  While not being holders of such rights or entitled 
to  rights  under  such  contracts,  have  power  to 
exercise the rights deriving therl'!from; 
(3)  In a  fiduciary  capacity own  assets  of an under-
taking  or  shares  in  an  undertaking,  and  have 
power  to  exercise  the  rights  attaching  thereto. 
4.  Control  of  an  undertaking  is  not  constituted 
where, upon formation of an undertaking or increase 
of its  capital,  banks or financial  institutions  acquire 
shares in that undertaking with a view to selling them 
on  the  market,  provided  that  th~y do  not exercise 
voting rights in respect of those shares. 
Article  3 
Powers of decision of the Commission 
1.  When the Commission finds  that a  concentration 
is  caught  by  Article  1  (1)  and  that the  conditions 
laid  down in  Article  1  (3)  are  not satisfied,  it shall 
issue  a  decision  declaring  the  concentration  to  be 
incompatible with the common market. 
2.  The decision  by which  the  Commission  declares 
a  concentration to be incompatible within the mean-
ing  of  paragraph  1  shall  not  automatically  render 
null  and void  the legal  transactions relating to such 
operation. 
3.  Where  a  concentration has already been put into 
effect,  the  Commission  may  require,  by  decision 
taken  under paragraph 1  of by  a  separate decision, 
the undertakings,  or assets acquired or concentrated 
to  be separated or the cessation of common control 
or any other action that may be appropriate in order 
to restore conditions of effective competition. 
4.  When the  Commission finds that a  concentration 
is  caught by.Article 1 (1)  and that the conditions laid 
down  in  Article  1  (3)  are  satisfied,  it shall  issue  a 
decision  declaring  Article  1  (1)  to  be  inapplicable; 
conditions  and obligations  may be  attached thereto. 
5.  Subject  to  review  by  the  Court  of  Justice,  the 
Commission  shall  have  sole  power  to  take  the  de-
cisions provided for in this Article. 
Article  4 
Prior notifications of concentrations 
1.  Concentrations shall  be notified to the Commis-
sion before they <!re put into  effect, where·the aggre-
gate  turnover  of  the  undertakings  concerned  is  not 
less than one thousand million units of account. 
2.  Where  concentrations  proposed by  an  undertak-
ing or a group of undertakings have already reached 
or exceeded the amounts referred to in paragraph 1, 
they  shall  be exempted from  the obligation. of prior 
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control of which they propose to acquire is  less  than 
30 million units of account. 
3.  The  obligation  to  notify  shqll  be  discharged  by 
the  person or undertaking  or the  group  of  persons 
or  undertakings  which  proposes  to  acquire  control 
within the meaning of Article 2. 
4.  Concentrations  which  are  not  caught  by  para-
graph 1  may nevertheless be notified to the Commis-
sion before they are put into effect. 
Article 5 
Detailed rules for calculating turnover 
and market shares 
1.  (a)  The  aggregate  turnover  specified  in  Articles 
1  (2)  and  4  (1)  shall  be  obtained by  adding 
together  the  turnover  for  the  last  financial 
year for all goods and services of: 
(i)  the undertakings participating in the con-
centration; 
(ii)  the  undertakings  and  groups  of  under-
takings .  which  control  the  undertakings 
participating  in  the  concentration  within 
the meaning of Article 2; 
(iii)  the  undertakings  or groups  of undertak-
ings  controlled  within  the  meaning  of 
Article  2  by the undertakings  participat-
ing in the concentration. 
(b) The market shares referred to in Article 1  (2) 
near those  held  in  the  last  financial  year  by 
all  the  undertakings  listed  in  subparagraph 
(a)  above. 
2.  In  place of turnover as  specified in Articles  1  (2) 
and  4  (1)  and  in  paragraph  1  of  this  Article,  the 
following shall be used: 
for  banking  and financial  institutions:  one  tenth 
of their assets; 
for  insurance  companies:  the  value  of the  pre-
miums received by them. 
Article  6 
Commencement of proceedings 
1.  Where the  Commission considers  that a  concen-
tration is  likely  to  become the subject of a  decision 
under  Article  1  (1)  or  (3),  it  shall  commence  pro-
ceedings  and so inform the undertakings in question 
and the competent authorities in the Member States. 
2.  As  regards concentrations notified to it, the Com-
mission shall  commence proceedings within a period 
not  exceeding  3  months  unless  the  relevant  under-
takings  agree  to  extend  that period.  The  period of 
3  months  shall  commence  on the  day  following  re-
ceipt of the notification,  or if  the information to be 
supplied  with the  notification  is  incomplete,  on  the 
day  following the receipt of the complete information. 
3.  The  Commission  may  commence  proceedings 
after  the  expiry  of the  3  months  period  where  the 
information  supplied  by  the  undertakings  in  the 
notifica!ion is false or misleading. 
4.  Without prejudice to paragraph 3 a concentration 
notified to the  Commission shall be presumed to be 
compatible  with  the  common  market ·if  the  Com-
mission  does  not  commence  proceedings  before  ex-
piration of the period specified in paragraph 2. 
ArtiCle  7 
Suspension of the effecting of the concentration 
1.  Undertakings  shall  riot  put into effect  a  concen-
tration  notified  to  the  Commission  before  the  end 
of the time limit provided for in Article 6  (2)  unless 
the  Commission informs them before the end of the 
time limit that it is  not necessary to commence pro-
ceedings. 
2.  Where  the  Commission  commences  proceedings 
it may by decision  require  the  undertakings  to  sus-
pend  the  concentration until it  has  decided  whether 
the  concentration  is  compatible  with  the  common 
market or has closed the proceedings. 
Article  8 
Communications of objections and hearings 
1.  Before taking decisions as  provided for in Articles 
3, 7, 13  and 14, the Commission shall give the under-
takings concerned the opportunity of being heard on 
the  matters  to  which  the  Commission  has  taken 
objection.  The  same  opportunity  shall  be  given  to 
associations  of  undertakings  concerned  before  de-
cisions before being taken as  provided for in Articles 
13  and 14. 
2.  If the  Commission  or the  competent  authorities 
of the Member States consider it necessary, the Com-
mission may also. hear other natural or legal persons. 
Applications to be heard on the part of such persons 
shall,  where  they  show  a  sufficient  interest,  be 
granted. 
3.  Articles  2,  3, 4, 7, 8,  9, 10  and 11  of Regulation 
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Article 9 
Closure ofproceedings 
If,  after  having  commenced  proceedings,  the  Com-
mission considers that there are no grounds for action 
against a concentration, it shall close the proce.edings 
and  so  inform  the  undertakings  concerned  and  the 
competent authorities of the Member States. 
Article  10 
Requests for information 
1.  In  carrying  out the  duties  assigned  to it by this 
Regulation, the Commission may obtain all necessary 
infonn~ation  from  the  governments  and  competent 
authorities  of  the  Member States  and  from  under-
takings and associations of undertakings. 
2.  When  sending  a  request  for  information  to  an 
undertaking or association of undertakings, the Com-
mission shall at the same time forward a copy of the 
request  to  the  competent  authority  of  the  Member 
State in  whose  territory the  seat of the  undertaking 
or association of undertakings is situated.  , 
3.  In its request the Commission shall state the legal 
basis  and  the  purpose  of  the  request  and  also  the 
penalties  provided for in Article  13  (1)  (b)  for sup-
plying incorrect information. 
4.  The owners of the undertakings or their represen-
tatives and, in the case of legal persons, companies or 
firms,  or of associations having no legal personality, 
the persons  authorized to represent  them  by  law .or 
by  their  constitution,  shall  supply  the  information 
requested. 
5.  Where  an  undertaking  or  assoCiation  of  under-
takings  does  not  supply  the  information  requested 
within  the  time  limit  fixed  by  the  Commission,  or 
supplies  incomplete · information,  the  Commission 
shall  by  decision  require  the information to be  sup- . 
plied.  The decision  shall  specify what information is 
required,  fix  an appropriate time limit within which 
it  is  to  be  supplied  and  mention  the  penalties  pro-
vided for in Article  13  (1)  (b)  and Article  14  (1)  (a) 
and  the  right  to  have  the  decision  reviewed  by  the 
Court of Justice. 
6.  The Commission  shall  at the  same time forward 
a  copy of its  decision  to the competent authority of 
the Member State in. whose territory the seat of  the 
undertaking  or association of undertakings is situated. 
Article  11 
Investigations by the authorities of the Member States 
1.  At the request of the Commission, the competent 
authoriti~s of the Member States shall undertake the 
investigations  which  the Commission considers to be 
necessary under Article 12 (1), or which it has ordered 
by  decision  pursuant to Article  12  (3).  The officials 
of  the  competent  authorities  of the  Member  States 
responsible  for  conducting  these ·investigations  shall 
exercise  their powers upon production of an authoriz-
ation in writing issued by the competent authority of 
the Member State in whose territory the investigation 
is  to  be made.  Such  authorization  shall  specify  the 
subject matter and purpose of the investigation. 
2.  If so requested by the Commission or by the com-
petent authority of the Member State in whose terri-
tory the  investigation is  to be  made,  officials  of the 
Commission may assist the officials of such authority 
in carrying out their duties. 
Article  12 
Investigating powers of the Commission 
1.  In  carrying  out the  duties  assigned  to it by  this 
Regulation,  the  Commission  may  undertake  all 
necessary investigations into undertakings and associ-
ations of undertakings. 
To  this  end  the  officials  authorized  by  the  Com-
mission are empowered: 
(a)  to examine the books and other business records; 
(b) to take or' demand copies  of or extracts from the 
books and business records; 
(c)  to ask for oral explanations on the spot; 
(d) to enter any premises,  land and  means  of trans-
port of un'dertakings. 
2.  The  officials  of  the  Commission  authorized  to 
carry  out  these  investigations  shall  exercise  their 
powers upon production of an authorization in writ-
ing specifying the 'subject matter and purpose of the 
investigation and the penalties provided for in Article 
13  (1)  (c)  in  cases  where production of the required 
books  or  other  business  records  is  incomplete.  In 
good  time  before  the.  investigation,  the  Commission 
shall inform the  competent authority of the Member 
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made of the investigation and of the identity of the 
authorized officials. 
3.  Undertakings  and  assoc1at10ns  of  undertakings 
shall  submit to investigations ordered by  decision of 
the  Commission.  The decision  shall  specify  the sub-
ject matter and purpose of the investigation, appoint 
the  date  on  which  it  is  to  begin  and  indicate  the 
penalties provided for in Article 13  (1)  (c)  and Article 
14 (1)  (b)  and the right to have the decision reviewed 
by the Court of Justice. 
4.  The Commission shall  take decisions  referred  to 
in paragraph 3 after consultation with the competent 
authority of the Member State in whose territory the 
investigation is to be made. 
5.  Officials of the competent authority of the Mem-
ber State in whose territory the investigation is  to be 
made may, at the request of such authority or of the 
Commission,  assist  the  officials  of  the  Commission 
in carrying out their duties. 
6  .•  Where .  an  undertaking  opposes  an  investigation 
ordered pursuant to  this  Article,  the  Member State 
concerned sha·ll  afford the necessary assistance to the 
officials  authorized  by  the  Commission  to  enable 
them  to  make  their  investigation.  Member  States 
shall,  after  consultation  with the  Commission,  take 
the necessary measures to this end before ..... 
Article  13 
Fines 
1.  The  Commission  may  by  decision  impose  on 
undertakings  and  associations  of  undertakings  fines 
of  from  1 000  to  50 000  units  of  account  where 
intentionally or negligently: 
(a)  they  supply incorrect  or misleading  information 
in a notification pursuant to Article 4; 
(b) they  supply incorrect information in  response  to 
a  request made pursuant to  Article  10  or fail  to 
supply information within the time limit fixed by 
a decision taken pursuant to Article 10, 
(c)  they produce the required books or other business 
records  in  incomplete form  during investigations 
under Article 11  or 12, or refuse to submit to an 
investigation  ordered by  decision  taken pursuant 
to Article 12. 
2.  The  Commission  may  by  decision  impose  on 
natural  or  legal  persons  fines  of  from  1 000  to 
1 000 000  units of account where, either intentionally 
or negligently, they commit a breach of the obligation 
to notify under Article 4. 
3.  The  Commission  may  by  decision  impose  fines 
not exceeding 10  %  of the value  of  the reorganized 
assets where undertakings either intentionally or neg-
ligently,  conclude  an  unlawful  concentration  before 
the end of the time limit provided for in Article 6 (2) 
or in  spite  of  a  decision  taken by  the  Commission 
under Articles 3 (1)  or 7 (2). 
Article  14 
Periodic penalty payments 
1.  The  Commission  may  by  decision  impose  on 
undertakings or associations of undertakings periodic 
penalty payments up to  25 000  units  of account for 
each  day  of the delay  calculated  from  the  date  ap-
pointed by the decision, in order to compel them: 
(a)  to supply complete and correct information which 
it  has  requested  by  decision  taken  pursuant  to 
Article 10; 
(b)  to submit to an investigation which it has ordered 
by decision taken pursuant to Article 12. 
2.  The  Commission  may  by  decision  impose  on 
such  undertakings  periodic  penalty  payments  up  to 
50 000  units  of account for  each  day  of  the  delay, 
calculated  from  the  day  appointed by  the  decision, 
in order to compel them to apply the measures result-
ing from a  decision  taken pursuant to Article  3  (3). 
Article  15 
Review by the Court o£ Justice 
The Court of Justice shall have unlimited jurisdiction 
within  the  meaning  of Article  17  of  the  Treaty to 
review  decisions  whereby the Commission has fixed 
a  fine  or periodic  penalty  payment;  it may  cancel, 
. reduce or increase the fine  or periodic penalty pay-
ment imposed. 
Article  16 
Professional secrecy 
1.  Information acquired as  a result of the application 
of Articles  10,  11  and 12 shall be used  only  for  the 
purpose of the relevant request or investigation. J 
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2.  The  Commission  and  the  competent  authorities 
of  the Member States,  their  officials  and  other  ser-
vants  shall  not  disclose  information  acquin;d  by 
them as  a result of the application of this Regulation 
and  of the  kind  covered  by  the obligation  of  pro-
fessional secrecy. 
3.  The provisions  of paragraphs  1  and  2  shall  not 
prevent  publication  of  general  information ·or  sur-
veys  which  do  not  contain  information  relating  to 
particular undertakings  or  associations  of  under-
takings. 
Article  17 
Time limits and publication of decisions 
1.  (a)  Decisions  under Article 3  (1)  and (4)  shall  be 
taken  within  9  months  following  rhe  date of 
commencement  of  proceedings,  save  where 
there  is  agreement  with  the  relevant  under-
takings to extend that period. 
(b) The period of 9 months shall not apply where 
the  Commission is  obliged  to  request  infor-
mation  by decision  taken pursuant to Article 
10  or  require  an  investigation  by  decision 
taken pursuant to Article 12. 
2.  The  Commission  shall  publish  the  decisions 
which it takes pursuant to Article 3. 
3.  The publication shall state the names of the par-
ties  and  the  main  content  of  the  decision;  it  shall 
have regard to the legitimate interest of undertakings 
in the protection of their business secrets. 
Article  18 
Unit of account 
For the purpose of this Regulation the unit of account 
shall  be  that used in  drawing up the  budget  of the 
Community in  accordance with Articles 207 and 209 
of the Treaty. 
Article  19 
Liaison with the authorities of the Member States 
1.  The Commission  shall  forthwith transmit to the 
competent authorities  of the Member States  a  copy 
of the notifications together with the most important 
documents lodged with the Commission pursuant to 
this Regulation. 
2.  The  Commission  shall  carry  out  the  procedure 
set  out  in  this  Regulation  in  close  and  constant 
cooperation  with  the  competent  authorities  of  the 
Member States;  such authorities shall have  the right 
to  express  their  views  upon  that procedure,  and  in 
particular  to  request  the  Commission  to  commence 
proceedings under Article 6. 
3.  The Advisory Committee on Restrictive  Practices 
and Monopolies shall be consulted prior to the taking 
of any decision under Articles 3, 13  and 14. 
4.  The Advisory Committee shall consist of officials 
having  responsibility  for  restrictive  practices  and 
monopolies.  Each  Member  State  shall  appoint  an 
official to represent it; he may be replaced by another 
official where he is unable to act. 
5.  Consultation shall  take place,  at a  meeting  con-
vened  at the  invitation of the Commission,  not ear-
lier  than  fourteen  days  following  dispatch  of  the 
invitation. A summary of the facts  together with the 
most  important  documents  and  a  preliminary  draft 
of  the  decision  to  be  taken,  shall  be  sent  with  the 
invitation. 
6.  The  Committee  may  deliver  an  opmwn even  if 
certain  members  are  absent  and unrepresented.  The 
outcome of the consultation shall  be  annexed to the 
draft decision. The minutes shall not be published. 
Article  20 
Exclusive application of this Regulation 
Regu'la~uions  ~EEC)  No  17  and  1017/68  shald  not 
apply  'DO  the  concentrations  covered  by  this  Regu-
lation. 
Article  21 
Implementing provisions 
The  Commission  shall  have power to  adopt imple-
menting provisions concerning the form, content and 
other details of notifications pursuant to Article 4 of 
this Regulation. 
Article  22 
This Regulation shall enter into force .....  . 
This  Regulation  shall  be  binding in its  entirety  and 
directly applicable in all Member States. 16- IV  330/73 - E 
Paragraphs  1  cmd  2  of Article 8,  concerning com.inunication  of 
objections and  hearings,  incorporate the correspondine paragraphs 
of Article 19  of Council  Regulation No.  17  (OJ  No.  13,  21.  2.  62). 
Paragraph  3 specifies the relevant  rules  of  Re~~lation No. 
99/63/EEC  on  the hearings  provided for in Article  19  (1)  ru1d  (2) 
of Council  Re~~lation No.  17  (OJ  No.  127,  20.8.63),  and 
declares them applicable  • 
.  Article 9  provides that where  the  Com::nission  has  fcriD£,lly  commenced 
proceedings but  finds,  while  examining the affair,  that it should 
not  ?.ct,  it must  formally close the proceedings  and  so  inforr.1 
the relevant undertakings  and  the  competent  authorities of the 
Member  States. 
~2-l~~lQ, on  requests for information,  is the  sruue  as the 
corresponding Article 11  of Regulation No.  17. 
A~~l£_ll, on  investigations by the authorities of the Member 
States,  is the  so.me  as the corresponding Article 13  of Regulation 
No.  17. 
Article 12,  on  the investigating powers  of the  Commission,  takes over, 
t'li th one  exception,  the corresponding Article 14  of Regu1dion  No.  17. 
Article 12  (1)  sentence  2  (b)  is formulated as  follo.-is:  to take 
"or request"  copies of or extracts  from  the books  and  business 
records.  This addition is necessary with regard to the experiences 
made  during investigations. 
Paragraph  l  of Article 13,  on  fines,  takes  over the corresponding 
prvvision of Article 15  (l) of Regulation No.  17  with,  however, 
a  variation as regards the amount  of the increased fines. 
Paragraph 2  provides for the imposition of fines  of from  1.000 to 
1  million units of account  for breaches of the obligation to give 
prior notification.  These  large pennlties should make  it possible 
to  ensure that the obligation to notify is respected. - 17- IV  330/73  - E 
Par?,graph  -3  provides for fines  whGre  the obligation to  suspend 
a  concentration is not  observed or where  a  decision taken pursuant 
to Article  3  (1)  is not  conroJ.ied  with~  The  fine may  be  as much 
a~ 10 %  vf the value of  the  reorganised assets. 
Article 14,  on  periodic penalty pnyments;  t'lk:es  over in its points 
(a)  and  (b),  points  (c)  and  (d)  of Article  16  (l) of Regulation 
t:o.  17.  Ho;,-revcr,  the amounts  hn.ve  been  increased. 
Paregraph 2  provides for periodic penalty payments  up 
to  50.000 units qf account  per day 'of delr.y in order to compel 
observance of measures  provided for by a  decision tBken pursuant 
to Article 3  (3). 
Article 15 1  on  revieH by the  Court  of Justice,  is the sarJe  as 
Artic1e 17  of Regulation lro.  17. 
Arti0le 16,  on professional  secrecy,  takes  over Article 20  of 
Regulation  N::>.  }7. 
Under Article 17  the period within which decisions must  be taken 
pursuant to ArUcle  3  ( l) or ( 4)  c.t  9  months  calcul?.ted from the 
date of commencement  of proceedings is stipulated.  This time-limit 
may  be  extended where  those  concerned cgree  and vrhere  circumstances 
so  require.  Pc:ragraph 1  further provides that the 9  month  period 
is not  applicable v.rhere  on the basis of a  formal  decision it has 
been necessary to request  further information or t,;)  carry out 
investigations. 
Paragraphs  2  and  3 provide for publication of decisions  teken 
pursua,nt  to Article 3,  l-lhile  account  is taken of the  legitimate 
interest of undertakings  in the protection of business  seoretso· - 18-
Article 18,  en the unit  of account,  is the same  as Article 18 
of Regulation No.  17. 
Jl,.rticle  19,  on  liais~m with the r,uthori  ties of the lv1ember  States, 
is an adopted version of Article 10  of  Regul~tion No.  17.  It 
should be pointed out,  however,  that  paragraph 2  :1.1lows  the 
I>ll:cmber  States to  rGquest the Conmission to  commence  pr:Jceedings 
under trticle 6. 
trticle 20  is based on  the fact  that the proposed regulation 
covers also  concentrations falling within the scope of Article  86 
of the EEC  Treaty.  Article  20  therefore declnres Regulations No.  17  , 
and,No.  1017/68Lnot  applicable  on  concentrations  caught by the 
proposed Regulation. 
Article  21  provides that  implementing provisions relating to 
notifications will be  adopted separately by the Commission. 
Article  22  1rrill  fix a  date f:)r the entry into force of the 
Regulation. 
)_  Regulation  (EEC)  No.  1017/68 of the Council  applying rules of 
competition tJ transport by rail,  road  and  inland waterway. 